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On the 25th of March the European Union celebrates the 50th anniversary of the Treaty 
of Rome by which the European Economic Community was established; the 
Netherlands being one of the founding members. Until this very day, albeit in revised 
form, this Treaty still constitutes the very centrepiece of the post-war European 
supranational legal order. 
 
Anniversaries are a time of celebration, a time of praise of previous accomplishments 
and encouragements to keep up the good work. I am confident that the Informal 
Meeting of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States planned for the 
25th of March will do an excellent job in issuing a statement to that effect.  
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Yet, these celebrations come at an awkward time for Europe: there is talk of a 
constitutional crisis and of a rift that goes through Europe caused by the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe. With the negative referenda in the Netherlands 
and France the destiny of this Treaty remains unclear. The initial disbelief triggered 
by the rejection of this European prestige project by the citizens of two of the 
founding members of the European Communities has given way for a certain 
resignation regarding the current state and the future perspectives for Europe. Taken 
aback were especially those who consider the Constitutional Treaty a substantial step 
forward. For some the importance of this project has existential proportions, as its 
failure is thought to jeopardize the future of European integration as a whole.  
 
Indeed, the realization is creeping in that the trusted method of achieving progress in 
the integration process faces an uncertain future. Doubts about the stability of the 
European Union are raised. Much seems thus at stake and it is little surprising that 
German Presidency in the Council is currently undertaking major efforts to revitalize 
the Constitutional Treaty while at the same time some Member States that have 
already implemented said Treaty put pressure on the unwilling or hesitant rest. 
 
The recent negative referenda in France and the Netherlands, as well as the general 
antipathy of the citizens in other Member States towards this Treaty should not be 
easily dismissed as the response of ill-informed citizens that oppose the Constitutional 
Treaty for the wrong reasons. Indeed, the truth may be somewhat more worrisome at 
least for those of us who are in principle in favour of European integration. 
 
What I will argue here today is that the current situation in Europe is to a considerable 
extent caused by the persisting deficit of democratic procedures that would allow and 
maybe even require citizens to claim ownership of European policies and decisions-
making. Under the current system continuing European integration both in terms of 
geographic widening and political deepening may not be a viable future option. What 
is needed is a fundamental review of today’s institutional framework. 
 
I would first of all like to introduce you to the basic modus operandi that has been 
applied in building Europe - a method that in my view has contributed to the current 
situation. Thereafter I will illustrate some of the main characteristics of today’s 
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institutional structure, which form a stumbling block to a greater ownership of 
European citizens. 
 
Finally, I would like to address the question how the present shortcomings could be 
addressed. In my view, the Constitutional Treaty does not provide a sustainable 
solution for the future. Instead we have to start to think outside the box by finally 
design an institutional framework that will at the very least no longer stand in the way 
of the ownership of citizens of European policies and decision-making. 
 
Europe- Condemned to continues further integration? 
 
[Ladies and Gentlemen] 
 
Looking back, European integration and with it the development of European law has 
taken place in waves. From setbacks mostly arose innovation and strength, as well as 
the collective will of the Member States to pick up the pieces, get back on their feet, 
and resume the integration process. At the end of the day the continuation of 
integration was safeguarded, even if this would require resuming construction on a 
different part of the European house by means of a different project. Past grand 
projects that have stranded on the cliffs of political and public resistance, such as the 
European Defence Community and the European Political Community of the 1950’s – 
to name only too - remind the younger generation of European lawyers: while Europe 
rarely lacked ambitions, it occasionally threatened to choke over them. 
 
The gradual Europeanization based on actual achievements, rather than a clear road 
map is anything but accidental. It even has a name: “Monnet-method”. It is closely 
linked to the visions of one of the masterminds of post-war European integration, the 
Frenchman Jean Monnet.  
 
Monnet’s vision of a united Europe were partly reflected in the famous Declaration by 
the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Robert Schuman in which the French 
government proposed the pooling of the French and German Coal and Steal 
production under a common authority. This was soon thereafter to become reality in 
the shape of the European Coal and Steal Community; the starting point of European 
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integration. For Monnet and others, barely five years after the end of World War II in 
Europe, the rapprochement of European states was considered a condition sine qua 
non for more stability in Europe. This was anticipated to be a slow process. Indeed, in 
the Schuman Declaration we find the following explanation: “Europe will not be 
made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete 
achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.”  
 
The final aim of the European project remained largely in the dark. The preamble to 
the original EEC Treaty referred to the determination: “…to lay the foundations of an 
every closer union among the peoples of Europe…” A similar reference can be found 
in today’s EU Treaty. The lack of a “finalité politique”, a clearly defined final aim of 
European integration both in geographic and political terms was and until this very 
day still is a deliberate choice. It has been characterized as a “constructive ambiguity”, 
which is to be preferred over an unconstructive discussion on principles. 
 
This process-based approach has put Europe in a position where it can only be as 
successful as the next integration step. Walter Hallstein, a less well-known but equally 
influential architect of the integration process and the first president of the 
Commission of the European Economic Community once famously compared 
European integration with a bicycle: a continues forward momentum created by the 
paddling is required in order to stop the bicycle from being pushed out of balance and 
from eventually falling to the side. 
 
This ratio has served on more than one occasion as an underlying argument in 
creating the necessary momentum to bring the political elites of the Member States 
together in reaching consensus over the next integration step. At least equally 
important, in the Member States this has formed the main argument in gaining what in 
most instances amounted to the passive consent of the citizens for the steady transfer 
of decision-making powers to the European level. 
 
The Monnet-method describes an inner logic to European integration: the political 
unification of Europe was to take place by means of economic integration through the 
introduction of a new legal order, establishing supranational institutions. 
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Indeed, the process has focused on the pooling of competencies for the exercise of 
policy. What was discounted for a long time were the consequences for the 
democratic legitimation and accountability of power increasingly exercised outside 
the established constitutional structures of the Member States and the impact this 
would have on the image of European integration in the eyes of its citizens. Scharpf 
observes rightly that efficiency rather than democracy has been perceived to ensure 
legitimacy.  
 
[Ladies and gentlemen] 
 
Economic integration served as a “Politikersatz”, i.e. as a substitute for politics. 
Techauer observes rightly that: “By viewing political integration solely as 
consequence of economic integration …Europe’s political leaders [have been 
released] of their responsibility for a consciously shaped political Union.“ 
 
This is partly reflected in the institutional framework of the European Communities. 
Namely the European Commission in its role as an independent broker of the 
Community interest has become a synonym for a technocratic approach to governance 
applied in Europe. 
 
The continuous widening and deepening of European integration has resulted in a 
disequilibrium. On the one side, the policy areas in which Europe effectively has 
taken over from the Member States in defining policies has increased steadily. On the 
other side, the extent to which the citizens of the Member States [the electorate] were 
involved in the decision-making process and the extent to which the European 
institutions as well as the national governments could actually be held accountable for 
their action became increasingly doubtful. 
 
Ironically, the realization of this democratic deficit – as what it became known – 
provided new arguments for further integration steps rather than meaningful 
institutional reforms. This is highlighted by the far reaching competencies which were 
introduced with the Treaty on the European Union (Maastricht Treaty). 
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Since the Maastricht Treaty, each new Treaty amendment was considered as a sheet 
anchor essential to keep Europe from drifting off course or, even worse, from 
stranding. “From Amsterdam Left-overs to Nice Hangovers”, Andrew Duff observed 
at the end of the negotiations on the Treaty of Nice. Already back than he predicted 
that “[L]ike a hangover, things can only get worse before they get better.” How right 
he was ! 
 
Seeking to generate the necessary momentum for reforms, Europe for some time has 
deliberately presented itself in an underlying state of crisis and near failure. This may 
turn out to have been a high-risk strategy.  
 
Indeed, the lack of any visible improvements has undermined the credibility of the 
European Union in the eyes of the citizens and heightened the distrust in both the 
European and national political elites to build a Europe whose fate is effectively 
determined by its citizens. 
 
What we can witness today is an increasing alienation of citizens with European 
policies and decision-making powers, a diffuse feeling of loss of control and influence 
which according to Besselink could also be observed in the public debates in the 
weeks preceding the Dutch referendum on the Constitutional Treaty. Europe is at 
times not perceived to offer solutions to problems, which directly affect the citizens of 
the Union. What is missing is a sufficient degree of ownership of citizens of European 
policies and decision-making. Ownership requires identification with, commitment to 
and appreciation of policies and decisions which are eligibly formulated and 
implemented in the citizen’s best interest. Moreover, this requires trust in national and 
European institutions. 
 
On the shortcomings of the current institutional structure of the European 
Union 
 
[Ladies and gentlemen] 
Today’s institutional structure does not support the emergence of such an ownership 
of the citizens of the European Union. 
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The penetration of the national legal order through European law complements the 
existing national structures by a new source of political power. Democratic legitimacy 
and accountability face new challenges. Rather than to refer to ‘government without 
statehood’, I would argue that these challenges are at least in part created by 
government above statehood. 
 
The question where the sources of democratic legitimation and accountability should 
be located in such a system is anything but straightforward. The reason for this is that 
by its very nature as a new legal order the European Communities cannot easily be 
placed on a scale ranging from a federation of states to a federal state.  
 
Europe is a half-way house. The current institutional structure of the European Union 
and the rules governing the exercise of power by and the relationship between these 
institutions clearly reflect the complexity of the European multidimensional system of 
governance. Indeed, the system aims at establishing an equilibrium both horizontally 
between the Member States and between the citizens of the Member States, as well as 
vertically between the national and supranational level.  
 
The position of the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission 
in the institutional framework reflect the vertical and horizontal division of 
legitimation and accountability. On the one hand, competencies in a considerable 
number of policy areas are exercised directly on the supranational level. Channels of 
democratic legitimation and accountability on the other hand remain largely 
intergovernmental in the sense they are facilitated through the Member States even in 
areas where the Member States have vested exclusive competencies in the European 
Union. 
 
The Council, consisting of the representatives of the governments of the Member 
States, takes central stage in the decision-making process on the European level. In 
Community context, in areas where the co-decision procedure applies it shares his 
role with the European Parliament. However, in a few remaining areas in the context 
of the EC Treaty and even more so in the context of the so-called second and third 
pillar of the EU, relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Police and 
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Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters, the Council dominating the decision-
making process do to the weak position of the European Parliament.  
 
The role which the Council plays in legitimising decisions on the European level and 
the extent to which it is actually accountable for its activities is rather dubious and 
arguably contributes to the lack of ownership of citizens of European policies and 
decisions-making. Both legitimacy and accountability is channelled through the 
government of the Member States and ultimately rests on the shoulders of the national 
parliaments.  
 
The extent to which national parliaments are actively involved in legitimising the 
position of the national government in the Council depends entirely on the national 
constitutional situation and the parliamentary procedures applicable. Indeed, 
government may have a general mandate to act whereby it is required to defend the 
position it has taken in the Council ex post. A less common approach, e.g. to be found 
in Denmark, requires government to obtain a parliamentary mandate for negotiations 
ex ante. The different constitutional arrangements in the Member States in this regard 
arguably result in a varying degree of legitimation.  
 
The power of national parliament ends so-to-say at the national borders. Government 
ministers can hardly be made responsible for Council decisions, which they have not 
supported. A collective responsibility for all decisions taken in the Council similar to 
that applicable to the Commission is neither accepted practice, nor would it reflect the 
legal position of the Council in the current institutional framework. 
 
This may not be a problem to the extent that decisions in the Council are taken by 
unanimity as no decision can be taken without the consent of a Member State. 
However, in the majority of cases in the Community context decisions in the Council 
are taken based on a complex system of allocation of voting rights to Member States, 
referred to as qualified-majority voting. The allocation of these voting rights is based 
on a system which attempts to combine proportionate representation of Member 
States with proportionate representation of the population of the Member States.  
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A cross-country comparison reveals that these voting rights do not accurately reflect 
the Member States share in the overall population of the EU. This is meant to be 
remedied by the right of a Member State to request verification that the qualified 
majority vote taken in favour of a European measure represents at least 62 % of the 
total population of the Union. But the application of this “demographic safety net” is 
currently optional ! 
 
Yet, even it is argued that in the end the qualified majority requirement ensures 
overall the democratic legitimacy of all decisions taken, this says little about the 
actual democratic back-coupling in the individual Member State. It results from the 
very nature of the supranational legal order that a Member State is fully bound by a 
decision taken in the Council against the votes of that Member State. But in such 
instances the role of the national parliament in legitimising decision-making ex post is 
diminished. 
 
Adding to this is the lack in many policy areas of a clear demarcation of competences 
between the national and supranational level. This makes it difficult not only for 
national parliaments but also for the citizens to assign failures. 
 
By channelling legitimation through the Member States, the present system neither 
advances the identification of citizens with European decisions nor does it promote 
the solidarity among the citizens of the European Union. The system allows Member 
States to distance themselves vis-à-vis their own citizens from decisions taken on the 
European level. At times this can be a rather convenient, as Europe has to take the 
beating for the implementation of painful but necessary reforms which national 
politicians like to evade. 
 
Against the present background Ungerer is right in observing that “[T]he democratic 
deficit is essentially the incapacity of national parliaments to control their 
governments in EC matters.” 
 
[Ladies and gentlemen] 
 
 10
The European Parliament is widely perceived as the Union’s democratic figurehead 
and proposals for a more democratic Europe regularly include calls to increase the 
position of the European Parliament vis-à-vis the Council and Commission. Yet, this 
by itself cannot sufficiently ensure ownership of European citizens over decisions 
taken on the supranational level. As a matter of fact, the credentials of the EP as the 
democratic institution are questionable. 
 
This has much to do with the composition of the European Parliament which does not 
amount to a proportionate representation of the citizens of the European Union. As it 
stands, primary Community law assigns seats to each Member State individually. A 
quick comparison of size of population per Member State and actual number of seats 
reveals that the system is biased in favour of the citizens of smaller Member States. 
The term smaller Member States is relative. Take the Netherlands and Luxemburg as 
an example: if the approximately half a million nationals of Luxemburg are 
represented by 6 MEP’s, by how many MEP’s should the Dutch citizens of which 
there are about 16.5 Million be represented ? If the answer “27” sounds wrong to you, 
you have got a point! This is the current number of seats allocated to the Netherlands 
in the European Union of 27 Member States. 
 
This system is further distorted by the fact that seats are not allocated on the basis of 
the actual number of EU citizens residing in a Member State but rather on the basis of 
nationality. Yet, according to primary Community law EU residence have the right to 
vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament under the 
same conditions as nationals of that Member State. The requirement stated in Article 
190(2) EC that the number of representatives elected must ensure appropriate 
representation of the people of the states is not met. 
 
Two motives can explain this inequality. Firstly, a true proportionate representation 
while at the same time not excluding the smallest Member States from receiving seats, 
would – in terms of sheer size – result in a sort of Chinese People’s Congress. The 
only solution to this problem was thought to be limiting the maximum number of 
MEPs. Furthermore, the current arrangements may also reflect the desire to not only 




Further enlargement of the European Union based on these arrangements will have 
two consequences: Firstly, the disproportional representation is poised to increase do 
to the limitation of the number of seats in the European Parliament. Secondly, 
enlargement result in an increase in the number of MEP’s to population ratio. 
Europe’s political elite will thus be further distanced from the electorate. 
 
The role of the European Parliament as the representative of the will of the citizens of 
the European Union is further weakened by the absence of European wide political 
parties. A vital channel for public opinion to enter the decision-making process is 
missing. Currently national parties prevail which nominate candidates for the 
elections to the European Parliament. The lack of a uniform electoral system, the 
allocation of seats to Member States rather than European constituencies and the 
reliance on national political parties facilitate a system whereby MEP’s are elected on 
the basis of issues which are of a domestic rather than European nature.  
 
Even if the issue of proportionate representation could be solved [and I shall come 
back to that point in due course] there remains the issue of the current position of the 
European Parliament in the decision-making process. Since its metamorphose from 
the general assembly, as it was referred to in the early days of European integration, to 
the European Parliament and the introduction of direct elections in 1979, the role of 
the European Parliament in the institutional triangle has increased substantially both 
in the decision-making procedure and in contributing to an inter-institutional system 
of checks and balances. Yet, considering its powers it still cannot easily be compared 
to a national parliament. This is first and foremost highlighted by the near absence of 
any formal right to propose Community legislation, a role that is assigned to the 
Commission. 
 
Moreover, in a number of important areas decisions can still be taken without the 
consent of the European Parliament. In particular the rather mediocre role that the 
European Parliament plays in the third pillar of the European Union on Police and 
Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters is less than impressive. Despite the growing  
importance of this area and impact on the life of citizens, the influence of the 
European Parliament in the decision-making process is limited to being consulted and 
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to being informed by the Council and the Commission on discussions that have taken 
place.  
 
[Ladies and Gentlemen] 
 
The Commission plays a crucial role in the policy formation on the European level, 
foremost through its almost exclusive right of initiative for Community legislation. 
Moreover, the Commission exercises its own partly original and partly delegated 
decision-making powers. 
 
In terms of democratic legitimation the position of the Commission may have been 
the most vulnerable with regard to potential criticism, as it is neither directly elected 
nor composed of national government representatives. Despite the fact that position of 
the Commission has been strengthened over time with the European Parliament 
currently fulfilling a key function in this regard, the Commission is arguably the most 
remote from the citizens 
 
It is rather questionable whether it is actually perceived by the citizens as the 
custodian of the Community interest and thus, ultimately of their interests. One 
important reason for this is to be found in the way in which the Commission is at 
times pictured as a quasi-representation of the national interests of the Member States. 
This habit is widespread among politicians and journalists particular in smaller 
Member States, where the Commission is portrayed as an indispensable 
counterweight to a Council which is allegeable dominated by the large Member 
States.  
 
The haggling about portfolios that can be witnessed with each new Commission that 
comes into office, as well as the long lasting heated debate about the abolishment of 
the principle of one Commissioner per Member State must leave citizens with the 
impression that the Commissioners are really just another permanent representation of 
the Member States in Brussels. The true reason for this power of attraction of the 




Continuation through reorientation 
 
[Ladies and Gentlemen]  
 
Continuing European integration in terms of widening and deepening in my vision 
should not be pursued without the broad consent of the citizens of the European 
Union. This not achieved by simply explain more plainly the past achievements of 
European integration and its advantages. Instead citizens have to be enabled to claim 
ownership of European policies and decision-making. 
 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
 
I started this lecture with reference to the Constitutional Treaty, which is currently 
very much on the agenda again. It should be remembered that Treaty is the result of a 
deliberative process, which aimed at making the European Union among others more 
democratic. 
 
So does the Constitutional Treaty deliver ? The short answer is No ! This Treaty to a 
large extent preserves today’s patterns of democratic legitimacy and accountability as 
part of the existing institutional framework. It is far from constituting the knight in 
shining armour as which it is portrayed by some. 
 
Indeed, the hybrid shape of the Council which tries to combine the equal; 
representation of citizens with the equal representation of Member States is 
maintained and so are the vertical and horizontal lines of democratic legitimation and 
accountability. If anything the role of the Member States is increased due to the future 
role of the European Council and the creation of the Union Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 
 
Unfortunately, the Treaty does not offer adequate remedies for the challenges facing 
Europe today in terms of lack of ownership of its citizens, not even to mention in an 
even larger European Union. While explicitly stating that the Union is founded on 
representative democracy, today’s system of disproportionate representation is 
granted a quasi-constitutional status. The Constitutional Treaty refers to a 
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‘digressively proportional’ representation of European citizens. In plain English this 
means that “…increasingly larger populations are represented by increasingly fewer 
additional seats.” 
 
Hard luck for those citizens living in the more populated Member State. In order to 
get more bang for our vote [to apply a rather well-known expression from the 
advertisement world] and given that EU nationals are in principle entitled to vote in 
their country of residence, we should all move to Luxemburg well ahead of the next 
elections to the European Parliament in 2009. 
 
Some well-informed listeners in the audience may think that not all is lost given that 
the Constitutional Treaty is providing national parliaments with a direct access to the 
legislative process on the Union level. National parliaments would be given the task 
to monitor compliance with the principle of subsidiary which - put in a nutshell – 
restricts Union activities outside the areas of exclusive competences to instances 
where the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States. 
 
However, it is questionable whether the Constitutional Treaty actually introduces a 
workable procedure that enhances the democratic legitimacy of the Union activities 
through the accountability of its legislative organs. In a rather interesting recent PhD-
study on the role of national parliaments in the supranational legal order, Phillip 
Kiiver raises doubts. He comes to the conclusion: “…putting false hopes in the 
national parliaments would mean to accept far less than what we are entitled to in 
terms of representative democracy in the European Union.” 
 
Advocating the channelling of democratic legitimacy primarily through the national 
parliaments bears considerable risks. The biggest problem may lay in the high 
potential of this procedure to politicise and indeed polemize the procedure in ways, 
which are counterproductive for the European legislative process. It is far from 
certain that the opinion formation in the national parliaments will be based on the 
merits of the respective European drafts rather than domestic political considerations 
and the desire to play a more substantive role in European policy formation. 
Moreover, it is at least questionable whether national parliaments will actually restrict 
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themselves to the question whether the subsidiarity principle has been observed. 
National parliaments may eventually have to be reminded of the limits of their 
competence, which will cause conflicts. With the number of Member States in the EU 
growing, so does the potential for opposition to European legislative activities not 
necessarily based on its merits. 
 
The Constitutional Treaty also introduces an element of participatory democracy. At 
least one million citizens who are nationals of a significant number of Member States 
would be allowed to take the initiative of inviting the Commission, within the 
framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where 
citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of 
implementing the Constitution. The requirement of a million signatures from a 
significant number of Member States may prove to be too high a hurdle to give this 
provision any real meaning. Moreover, the proposal de jure does not constitute more 
than a petition to the Commission which, as the choice of the word ‘invite’ suggests, 
is under no obligation to act. Dougan rather drastically refers to this procedure “…as a 
glib piece of window-dressing”. 
 
All things considered it is rather astonishing that the Constitutional Treaty is widely 
perceived as providing the necessary institutional reforms ensuring that European 
integration can continue. This is certainly not the case when it comes to enhancing the 
democratic legitimacy and accountability of the European Union and, more closely in 
enhancing the ownership of citizens. 
 
Thinking outside the box 
 
[Ladies and gentlement] 
 
In my opinion the Constitutional Treaty will not free national and European policy-
makers and academics from the task of debating the future shape of the European 
Union. Hulsman and Techau are right in observing that the heated Constitutional 
debate constitutes a deflection from the real political challenges which Europe faces 
in the future. Even if the current German Presidency in the Council succeeds in the 
somewhat desperate attempt to salvage the Constitutional Treaty, the challenge of 
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posed by the increasing alienation of European citizens from Europe and the lack of 
ownership in European policies and decision-making is here to stay . 
 
In my views the Monnet-method has been too successful to be abandoned altogether 
not least because debating grand institutional designs for a final shape of Europe is 
too much of an academic exercise, as any such plans would stand little chance of 
success. Yet, welcoming the ambiguous nature of the European Union, as Stephen 
Weatherill has put it, should not rule out the further evolution of its institutional 
framework so to increase its democratic credentials. The institutional form of the 
European Union needs to follow much more its function. 
 
The unsuccessful attempts at Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice to introduce more 
democracy within the confinements of the present framework highlight what is really 
required. That is to step outside the box of current thinking. It calls for a re-evaluation 
of the before mentioned vertical and horizontal channels outside the confinements of 
the present system of legitimacy and accountability. The citizens of the European 
Union more than is the case in the present system become the reference point for the 
institutional arrangements. 
 
With regard to the European Parliament, in my opinion the introduction of a uniform 
electoral system based on a European ballot is long overdue. Seats in the European 
Parliament should no longer be distributed to Member States and the elections to the 
European Parliament should no longer be held separately in each Member States 
based on a national electoral ballot. 
 
The main obstacles is the lack of European political parties that could rise above the 
Member State’s political sphere and could actually address electorates across boarders 
based on trans-national programs.  
 
Some would argue that these European parties have not emerged due to a lack of 
European awareness or rather identity on parts of the electorate. However, conversely 
it may also be argued that such a European identity is missing precisely because of 
today’s system based on national parties. This amounts to a chicken-or-egg debate. 
What is pretty much undisputed is that the European identity is lagging behind the 
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increasing constitutionalization of the European Union. The way out of this dilemma 
is to take concrete steps towards establishing both.  
 
Once a European ballot is established, the creation of various European parties could 
no longer be postponed. Albeit currently little known outside expert circles, the cross-
country political groups in today’s European Parliament could certainly function as a 
source of inspiration. Moreover, national parties of the Member States have already 
started to organise themselves in European umbrella organisations, such as for 
example the European Socialist Party, where the Dutch PvdA is a member, or the 
European Federation of Green Parties, where the Dutch Groen links party is a member 
of.  
 
What could result from this is what Caramani describes as a system “…in which 
European politics is structured along non-territorial European-wide functional 
identities and interests…” 
 
If the role of the European Parliament as the true directly democratically legitimised 
European institution is revalued in such a way, its position vis-à-vis the other 
institutions and namely the Council and the European Commission has to be 
reassessed as well, namely in the legislative process. Firstly, the European Parliament 
should finally be given a right of initiative for legislative proposals. It has been 
suggested that the European Parliament in the past has not really lobbied for such a 
right, being quite content with its rather passive role in this regard. The lack of any 
proposals by the European Parliament to the inclusion of such a right during the 
negotiations to the Constitutional Treaty seem to provide evidence for this.  
 
If its legitimacy is enhanced the European Parliament should and would have to 
accept a more mature role in the decision-making process on the European level. It 
should also be anticipated provide the European Parliament with a role in formulating 
the general political guidelines, a task which is presently exclusively assigned to the 
European Council. This would require an even more active role European Parliament 
as it would be much more visible in the policy-making process and could be more 
easily judged on its own initiatives. 
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It should no longer be possible to pass legally binding acts without the consent of the 
European Parliament in any policy areas including at least today’s third pillar. Indeed, 
this is one of the view areas where the Constitutional Treaty would actually 
substantially enhance the role of the European Parliament in the decision-making 
procedure, as the third pillar is abolished and fused with today’s provisions on visas, 
asylum and immigration into a single Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and 
would to a large extent become subject to the ordinary legislative procedure 
established by the Constitutional Treaty. 
 
[Ladies and gentlemen] 
 
The revaluation of the position of the European Parliament in the institutional 
framework would not automatically result in an institutional structure, which 
represents a decision against a confederate European model and in favour of a federal 
state.  
 
This issue relating to the final shape of European integration is not decided by the 
composition of the European Parliament or its role in the decision-making procedure, 
but rather by the extent to which the Member States transfer competencies to the 
European Union and thereafter by the extent to which decisions require the consent of 
the Council. In this respect, today’s fragile balance of power between the national and 
the supranational level could thus be upheld. In any event, for the time being, 
considering the important role which national parliaments play in the implementation 
of secondary Community law, the role of the Council remains an important lifeline. 
This rules out more radical ideas, such as taking the Council completely out of the 
equation. 
 
However, in the long run, considering the further enlargements, more far reaching 
changes of the present system would have to be considered. One proposal would be to 
differentiate between legislative proposals, which require the consent of the Council 
and proposals, on which the ultimate decision rests with the European Parliament. The 
systematic of exclusive and shared competencies which is currently applied in 
defining the vertical distribution of power between the national and supranational 
level of the European Union could form the basis of a redefinition of the horizontal 
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distribution of power between the Council and the European Parliament. Where 
considered appropriate this could be based on a new categorization and maybe even 
redistribution of competencies.  
 
Both the extent to which the Council’s consent is required for legislative proposals to 
pass, as well as the internal majority requirements can act as an adjusting screw in 
deciding on the balance of power between the national and suprasnational European 
level.. By the introduction of a passerelle clause it should be made easier to lower an 
remaining unanimity requirements in the Council to qualified majority voting. The 
arrangements foreseen in the Constitutional Treaty in this regard are worth preserving. 
 
The substantial reinforcement of the position of the European Parliament would also 
have consequences for the European Commission. Yet, it would be premature to 
consider the Commission redundant in such revised institutional system. While it 
would lose its exclusive right of initiative and thus its exclusive position as a policy 
maker, this could also strengthen the position of the Commission. Firstly, with the 
Member State’s focus on the Commission as the main policy-maker being removed, 
the way for a new consensus on the composition of the Commission based on actual 
operational requirements would be open. Secondly, suggestions such as those by 
Temple Lang to separate the policy-proposing from the decision-making powers of 
the Commission and to focus on the latter would be worth studying. This could also 
include proposals to shift executive tasks from the Council to the Commission could 
be examined. 
 
The legitimacy of the European Commission could be further strengthened by 
extending the participation of the European Parliament in the election of the 
Commission President and the Commissioner’s. It would be desirable to provide the 
European Parliament with a right to nominate candidates and to reject individual 
Commissioners-designate. Moreover, in particular in the light of proposals to transfer 
more executive tasks onto the Commission, its accountability needs to be reinforced. 
 
[Ladies and gentlemen] 
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This emphasise on institutional arrangements is certainly not uncontested. Indeed, 
recently this rather more conventional approach to increasing democracy in the 
European Union has been challenged. It has been argued that the democratisation of 
Europe calls for the emergence of a European demos first, that is a common populace 
rather than the populace of the individual Member States. The concern that is raised in 
this context is that the introduction of more democratic decision-making without a 
European demos would deepen the crisis as “…majority tyranny of one or more demoi 
over others…” could emerge. The key to establishing such a European demos is 
believed to be the creation of substantive citizen’s rights and their effective protection 
rather than more direct channels of democratic participation of the citizens. 
 
It is true that such a European populace and a European public opinion is absent and 
that this can to some extent explain the lack of ownership of European citizens and the 
indifference towards Europe. I would also agree with those that argue that the rather 
clumsy symbolism of the type found in the name and some of the contents of the 
Constitutional Treaty will do little in generating such a European identity. Indeed, 
creating and upholding substantive rights may be a more successful path.  
 
However, the creation of such rights can hardly take place in a vacuum. The question 
that arises is: Who decides what these rights should be ? Is this merely a question of 
taking stock of the constitutional traditions, which all Member States have in common 
thereby opting for the lowest common denominator? Or is it the European Court of 
Justice in interpreting the current competencies of the Europe Community and Union? 
Should this be left to the governments of the Member States bargaining at the next 
Intergovernmental Conference or to the European Commission, who claims to follow 
a bottom-up approach by consulting non-governmental organisations whose 
democratic credentials are often weak and who certainly cannot be equated with the 
European citizens? 
 
It has also been argued that the current structure of the European Union is a mere 
mirror image of the Member States, where democratic legitimacy and accountability 
no longer always follow the classic path of parliamentary and ministerial 
responsibility. The increasing delegation of government tasks to quasi non-
governmental organisations in the name of efficiency serves regularly as an example. 
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Those complaining about a democratic deficit in Europe are believed to measure with 
different standards and to live in an ideal world. According to this opinion, what 
matters more than democratic procedures, is that policies are pursued which reflects 
the public interest. Thus, output rather than input legitimacy. For Weiler this 
philosophy promoted throughout many Commission documents amounts to “Bread 
and Circus”. 
 
It might be the case that in the end citizens are more interested in outcome in terms of 
social welfare, such as high employment, economic growth and public health, rather 
than in the way in which these outcomes come about. And it can also be little doubt 
that in some of these policy areas the European Union scores comparably low.  
In a recent survey on behalf of the European Commission, the fight against 
unemployment, the protection of social rights and ensuring economic growth were 
given the lowest scores in terms of performance of the European Union. On a Dutch 
scale from 1-10, all three scored below 5 and thus, as we say around here: ruim 
onvoldoende! 
 
However, if democratic institutions are on the decline at the national level, does that 
not actually make the establishment of such structures on the European level even 
more important given the reliance of today’s system on the Member States ? And 
moreover again, who decides what these public interests are and who decides on what 
policies are given priority when it comes to allocating scarce public funds? 
 
[Ladies and Gentlemen] 
 
What becomes clear is that a process is required by which the citizen’s preferences 
can be identified. This comes about through democratic decision-making processes, 
facilitated first and foremost by an institutional framework, which provides the 
citizens of the European Union with a higher degree of ownership over the decisions 
taking on the European level on their behalf.  
 
In a recent survey on the future of Europe, participants were asked about the best way 
for citizens to ensure that their voice is heard in Europe. 56 % responded with ‘voting 
in elections’. This was the winning score. It seems like that not all is lost when it 
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[Ladies and gentlement] 
 
The title of my lecture is “Continuation or reorientation – What Future for European 
integration?” I have offered you a glimpse of my answer to this question which in a 
nutshell amount to continuation through reorientation! 
 
Admittedly, I have not offered you a blueprint for the future, and as regards the brief 
proposals I have made, the devil is very much in the detail. Moreover, the institutional 
framework of the European Union is only one – albeit in my vision an important – 
variable. 
 
But Europe cannot and should not continue on the chosen path of widening and 
deepening if the current distrust in national and European institution and the lack of 
commitment to and appreciation of the citizens continues. Citizens have to be enabled 
to claim ownership of European policies and decision-making processes. The 
institutional framework of the European Union can make an important contribution in 
this regard. By putting our hopes on a Constitutional Treaty whose faith is undecided 
may only result in a further distancing of Europe from its citizens. Member States 
should stop to repeat with the persistence of a prayers wheel that Europe needs to 
become more democratic and should finally start to act on behalf of Europe and its 
citizens!  
 





Ik heb gezegd ! 
